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The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis,
with Special Reference to Law and Economics
Richard A. Posner*
INTRODUCTION
Scarcity of quantitative scholarship has been a serious shortcoming of legal research, including economic analysis of law. When
hypotheses cannot be tested by means of experiments, whether
contrived or natural, and the results assessed rigorously by reference
to the conventions of statistical inference, speculation is rampant
and knowledge meager. We can improve the situation, I shall argue,
by making greater use of citations analysis as a methodology of
quantitative empirical research.
I do not want to be misunderstood, however, as suggesting that
nonquantitative empirical research on the legal system is valueless;
much distinguished work in that vein has been done in recent
years.1 Much of the study of legal rules by economic analysts of law
is empirical in spirit, albeit qualitative rather than quantitative.2 And
there is a certain amount of quantitative study of law, much of it
based on what are now abundant data concerning the number and
type of cases filed and decided; I have done some of this work
myself.3 There is also an extensive literature testing the Bentham*

Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. This paper originated as a presentation to
the University of Chicago’s Workshop in Rational Models in the Social
Sciences, and I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments. I
thank Susan Burgess and Paul Choi for their helpful research assistance, and
Theodore Eisenberg, William Landes, and Stephen Stigler for their very
helpful comments on a previous draft of the paper.
1 An example is Robert Ellickson’s justly celebrated field study of norm-guided
behavior, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
2 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law (1987).
3 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform, pts. 2–3 (1996); Posner, “Explaining the Variance in the Number of
Tort Suits across U.S. States and between the United States and England,” 26
Journal of Legal Studies 477 (1997).
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Becker model of crime on statistical data.4 Behavioral law and
economics is notably quantitative-empirical in its emphasis.5 Legal
sociologists have done a lot of valuable empirical work as well, much
of it quantitative.6 But the amount of quantitative empirical research
in law remains slight not only in proportion to the amount of other
legal research, but also in proportion to the opportunities that a
quantitative approach offers for illuminating hitherto intractable
issues.
Now as it happens both adjudication, a central practical activity
of the legal system, and legal research are citation-heavy activities.
This opens up the possibility that by exploiting the rich data
contained in citations indexes, economic analysts of law can test economic hypotheses about the legal system quantitatively, enlarge our
knowledge of adjudication and legal scholarship, and bring about
improvements in both these aspects of the legal enterprise. Counting
citations—mainly citations in legal cases of other legal cases, and
citations in scholarly journals of scholarly works—is already an
established method of empirical research in law, economics,
sociology (especially the sociology of science), and academic
administration. It is being used more and more in law7—mainly,
indeed in economic analysis of law, yet remains limited in relation to
4

For summaries of this literature, see Isaac Ehrlich, “Crime, Punishment, and
the Market for Offenses,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1996, pp. 43,
55–63; D. J. Pyle, “The Economic Approach to Crime and Punishment,” 6
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 1, 4–8 (1995).
5 See, for example, studies discusssed in Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and
Richard Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,” 50 Stanford
Law Review 1471 (1998), and in Sunstein, “Behavioral Law and Economics:
A Progress Report” (American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming).
6 I review this literature briefly in my book The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory 213–215 (1999).
7 See, for example, the conference volume “Interpreting Legal Citations”
(Journal of Legal Studies, supplement, forthcoming in January 1990). The papers
from the conference cover a wide range of topics, including law school
rankings, whether lateral hires to law school faculties are better scholars than
faculty members promoted from within, the growth of nonlegal citations i n
judicial opinions, and the application of fractal analysis to citations. I cite some
of the papers from the conference below.
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potential topics. Statistical analysis of citations practices has become
fast and cheap as a result of faster, more powerful computers, and of
computerized citations indexes.8 The cost of citations analysis is
falling.
But the fact that a particular kind of research is feasible, even
easy to do, cannot explain why anyone wants to do it. Low cost is
not enough; there have to be benefits—and anyway the opportunity
costs of adopting one research method over another are not low.
Citations analysis is growing mainly because it enables rigorous
quantitative analysis of elusive but important social phenomena such
as reputation, influence, prestige, celebrity, the diffusion of
knowledge, the rise and decline of schools of thought, stare decisis
(that is, the basing of judicial decision on previous
decisions—precedents), the quality of scholarly output, the quality of
journals, and the productivity of scholars, judges, courts, and
university departments.9
8 Primarily the indexes for the natural sciences (Science Citation Index), social
sciences (Social Sciences Citation Index), and the arts and humanities (Arts and
Humanities Citation Index) published by the Institute for Scientific
Information. In addition, for law—which has a long and rich history of
citation counting, see Fred R. Shapiro, “Origins of Bibliometrics, Citation
Indexing, and Citation Analysis: The Neglected Legal Literature,” 43 Journal
of American Society for Information Science 337 (1992)—the West Publishing
Company has excellent computerized databases of both judicial opinions and
legal articles. The original legal citations service, Shepard’s Citations, was in fact
the inspiration for the ISI indexes. Laura M. Baird and Charles Oppenheim,
“Do Citations Matter?” 20 Journal of Information Science 2, 3 (1994). The
World Wide Web is also usable for citations analysis; search engines such as
Alta Vista can be used to count “hits” to named individuals, books, or articles.
For uses of the Web in this way, see William M. Landes and Richard A .
Posner, “Citations, Age, Fame, and the Web” (forthcoming in Journal of Legal
Studies supplement); Marcy Neth, “Citation Analysis and the Web,” 17 Art
Documentation 29 (1998).
9 The literature of citations analysis is by now vast, and I will not attempt
exhaustive citation. The pioneers were sociologists of science. See, for example,
Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, pt. 5 (Norman W. Storer ed. 1973). For a book-length discussion,
now unfortunately rather out of date, by the founder of the ISI, see Eugene
Garfield, Citation Indexing—Its Theory and Application in Science, Technology,
and Humanities (1979), somewhat updated, however, in Garfield, “From
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Citations analysis is not an inherently economic methodology;
most of it has been conducted without any use of the theories or
characteristic empirical techniques of economists. It is an empirical
methodology usable by a wide range of disciplines. But I shall argue
that an economic framework fosters precision in its use. Indeed, the
human capital model developed by economists may actually be
essential to using citations analysis to compare and evaluate individual performance.
T HE R EASONS— AND THE M OTIVES— FOR C ITING
Citations (that is, mentions of a previous work, published or
unpublished, or simply of an author’s or other person’s name) figure
prominently in many forms of documentation (electronic as well as
printed), including patents, newspaper and magazine articles,
scholarly journals and books. In case-law systems, such as those of
the United States and England, citations are a conspicuous feature
of most judicial opinions. It does not follow from the commonness
of citing that citing is an activity worth studying. That depends on
why a work or author is cited. If there were no reason—if citations
were random—this would be an interesting finding but there would
be little point in studying citation practice further; indeed, there
would be no practice of citing to study. But if only because citing is
not costless—there is the bother of finding the citation, and the
possibility of criticism for misciting or failing to cite—it would be
surprising if citations were random, and there is evidence that they
are not. Notably, citation counts have been consistent predictors of
the receipt of high academic honors, such as the Nobel prizes in the
sciences.10
Citation Indexes to Informetrics: Is the Tail Now Wagging the Dog?” 48 Libri
67 (1998). Baird and Oppenheim’s article, cited in the preceding footnote, gives
a good overview of the field; with reference to science citations, see Dirk
Schoonbaert and Gilbert Roelants, “Citation Analysis for Measuring the Value
of Scientific Publications: Quality Assessment Tool or Comedy of Errors?” 1
Tropical Medicine and International Health 739 (1996).
10 See references in Gregory J. Feist, “Quantity, Quality, and Depth of Research as Influences on Scientific Eminence: Is Quantity Most Important?” 10
Creativity Research Journal 325, 326 (1997), and in Blaise Cronin and Taylor
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Several reasons for citing come to mind. The first, which is
dominant in historiography, is simply to identify a source of information, so that the reader of the citing work can verify the accuracy of statements of fact made in it.11 The second reason, which
is closely related, is to incorporate a body of information by reference,
that is, to guide the reader to a place where he can find the
information if interested in it. Let me merge these two reasons for
citing into one: “information.” I emphasize that “information” is to
be understood broadly, as taking in ideas and arguments as well as
facts. The motive for the informational citation is simply to respond
to a demand for information.
The next reason for citing, which I’ll call “priority,” is to
demonstrate compliance with any applicable norm against plagiarism
by acknowledging the authorship of ideas, arguments, or (in the case
of citations to “prior art” in patent applications) technology used in
the citing work. In scientific and social scientific fields, with the
partial exception of law, most citations are “priority” citations.
Strictly, priority citations are a subset of informational citations; the
priority is priority in making an argument, discovering an idea,
inventing a product or process. But whereas a writer will make
informational citations without prodding, simply in order to make
his work more valuable to the reader, he will make priority citations
(except to himself!) reluctantly, under the constraint of the
antiplagiarism norm.
Graham, The Citation Process: The Role and Significance of Citations in Scientific
Communication 27 (1984); cf. C. Y. K. So, “Citation Rankings versus Expert
Judgment in Evaluating Communication Scholars: Effects of Research
Specialty Size and Individual Prominence,” 41 Scientometrics 325 (1998); Paul
R. McAllister, Richard C. Anderson, and Francis Narin, “Comparison of
Peer and Citation Assessment of the Influence of Scientific Journals,” 31
Journal of the American Society for Information Science 147 (1980). As pointed out
later in this paper, citation studies of eminent judges yield results consistent
with the more common, qualitative indicia of judicial distinction.
11 “Historical footnotes list not the great writers who sanction a given
statement or whose words an author has creatively adapted, but the documents,
many or most of them not literary texts at all, which provided its substantive
ingredients.” Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History 33 (1997).
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Most self-citations are designed either to incorporate by reference information contained in other works by the citer, to establish
the priority of some earlier work of his over work done by others
since then, or to advertise his previous work in the hope that more
people will read it. One of the worries about citation analysis is that
as it becomes more familiar, citation behavior will become strategic,
and authors thus will cite themselves more in order to increase their
citations count. That is, the gains from self-advertising will be
greater and so the number of such citations will increase because the
cost of additional self-citations is low. But actually this gambit is unlikely to succeed, because it is so easy to subtract out self-citations in
counting citations to a person’s work. Reciprocal citing may be a
more serious problem. One can imagine informal deals between academic allies to jack up each other’s reputations by citing each other
heavily, although they will encounter the usual problems of holding
a cartel together. There is some evidence that journal editors receive
citations in the journals they edit that they would not receive if they
were not editors—citations designed to increase the likelihood that
the citing article will be accepted for publication.12
Another common reason for citing is to identify works or
persons with which or with whom the author of the citing work
disagrees. These citations (“negative citations”) are motivated not by
antiplagiarism norms but by the need to establish the context of the
citer’s work. Not to cite one’s opponent would be like reviewing a
book without naming the book or its author.
Still another reason for citing, one particularly important in law
and other “authoritarian” institutions such as hierarchical churches
and totalitarian states (consider the reason for citations to Mein
Kampf in Nazi Germany or for citations to the works of Marx and
Engels in communist socities), is to provide an authoritative basis for
a statement in the citing work. I’ll call this “authority” citing. In a
12

See Lydia L. Lange and P. A. Frensch, “Gaining Scientific Recognition by
Position: Does Editorship Increase Citation Rates?” 44 Scientometrics 459
(1999); Richard A. Wright, “The Effect of Editorial Appointments on the
Citations of Sociology Journal Editors, 1970–1989, 25 American Sociologist 40
(1989).
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system of case law, previously decided cases provide a reason
independent of analytical power for reaching a particular outcome in
the current case, and the citation of such a case is an invocation of
that authority. This is true even when the citation seeks to
distinguish or overrule the previous case. The citation is motivated by
the authority of the previous case, which may have to be deflected or
destroyed in order to enable the desired outcome of the current case.
But many judicial decisions have an informational rather than an
authority-related role; they are cited as shorthand for legal doctrines,
cogent arguments, or forceful articulations of relevant ideas or
policies. Few judicial citations are “priority” citations, however,
because there is no antiplagiarism norm in adjudication. In this
respect the situation in law resembles that in literature before
creativity became defined as originality.13
A final reason for citing, call it the “celebratory,” is midway
between informational citing and authority citing. The feature of
the cited work that induces the citation is the work’s prestige or
reputation.14 By associating it with his own work, the citer enhances the credibility of his work. Because this is a common reason
for citing, there is added uncertainty about the meaning to be
ascribed to a citation. It can signify an acknowledgement of priority
or influence, a useful source of information, a focus of disagreement,
an acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of the
cited work or its author. All of these are forms of influence, in a
broad sense, and that may be enough to justify lumping them
together for purposes of citations studies concerned with measuring
influence. But they differ as proxies for quality, and measuring
quality is the focus of some citations studies.
This problem, the interpretive problem presented by citation
behavior, is related to another problem, the problem of responsible
citation behavior, which arises from the distinction between a reason
13

See Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature 389–405 (revised and enlarged
ed. 1998).
14 There is an analogy to celebrity endorsements of products. See Jagdish
Agrawal and Wagner A. Kamakura, “The Economic Worth of Celebrity
Endorsers: An Event Study Analysis,” 59 Journal of Marketing 56 (1995).
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for citing and a motive for citing.15 Many self-citations, for example,
are motivated by a desire for self-aggrandizement, or by sheer
laziness—the cost of finding one’s own work to cite is less than the
cost of finding someone else’s. Not all are, though. Indeed, self- and
other citations to a person’s work might well turn out to be positively
correlated at least for heavily cited authors, because the previous work
of a productive and influential scholar may be a large part of the
knowledge basis of his current work. In the case of judicial citations,
the Landes study, discussed later, finds a positive correlation between
self- and other citations and explains that a judge who writes his
own opinions is more likely both to be an influential judge and to
cite himself a lot, because he is more familiar with his previous
decisions than his law clerks would be if they were writing his
opinions.
Resuming the catalog of “impure” motives for citing, I point out
that some citations reflect a desire to flatter the author of the cited
work, who may be in a position to assist the citer’s career or may be a
likely journal referee of the cited work. And some scholarly citations
are motivated by piety or gratitude, or by a desire to make a display of
erudition. I mentioned the possibility of reciprocal citing. It is even
conceivable that in highly competitive fields of scholarship, young
scholars especially might be reluctant to cite their peers, and prefer to
cite the dead, who are no longer competitors. Most important,
because the cost of inaccurate citing usually is low (primarily the cost
in being subjected to criticism for miscitation or for failing to find
the most apt work to cite—but if the obvious works are accurately
cited, few will complain that other works were unnecessarily or
inaccurately cited), there is much careless citing; and so quantitative
studies of citations are bound to contain a lot of “noise.” But imperfection of data is nothing new—nor, as we shall see, does it
disable useful statistical analysis—and there is some competitive
constraint on irresponsible citing because rival scholars have an
15

For a rare study of the motives for citing, see Peiling Wang and Marilyn
Domas White, “A Qualitative Study of Scholars’ Citation Behavior,” 33 Proceedings of the 59th ASIS Annual Meeting 255 (1995).
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incentive to expose such practices, but, rarely, as I have said, when
the irresponsibility merely takes the form of citing to excess.
Even if all citers were scrupulous and accurate, the heterogeneity
of citations would make simple aggregation prone to mislead, even
after such obvious sources of distortion as self-citations were
removed. Suppose, for example, that an academic department relied
on the number of citations to an academic’s scholarly writing as a
factor in deciding whether to give him tenure. Suppose further that
the principal criterion for tenure was originality. The writings of the
individual under consideration might have garnered a great many
citations, but if they were mostly informational in
character—perhaps he had written a series of review articles that
provided convenient summaries of previous work—the count of his
citations would give a misleading impression of whether he deserved
tenure.
This is a greater source of distortion than the possibility that
many of the citations to the individual’s work are negative. Negligible work is more likely to be ignored rather than to be cited. A
negative citation often indicates that a work has gotten under the
skin of the critic, perhaps because it mounts a powerful challenge to
established positions or ways of thinking.
T HE H ETEROGENEITY OF C ITATIONS
The signal, or information, conveyed by a citation, or by a count
of citations, varies along still other dimensions besides those of
reason and motive. A newspaper citation to a scholar’s work is a
better indication of the popular appeal of his work than a citation in
a scholarly citation to that work is, but the latter is a better
indication of the work’s scholarly character. A citation made by a
distinguished scholar or appearing in a high-quality journal is better
evidence of the quality of the cited work than a citation by an
undistinguished scholar or in an undistinguished journal. A citation
by the same or a lower court, for which the cited case is authoritative, is a weaker signal of respect or regard for the cited case or its
author than a citation by a higher or coequal court, which is not re-
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quired as a matter of stare decisis to follow, distinguish, or otherwise
refer to the cited case.
The number of citations to a scholarly work or a judicial
opinion may, moreover, reflect adventitious factors, in particular the
size of the population of potential citers and the citation conventions
of particular disciplines.16 These factors make comparisons across
fields and, because of growth in the number of journals, over time
difficult to make. Even within a single field differences in
specialization can confound citation comparisons; other things being
equal, more specialized, applied work is cited less often than more
general work (such as a survey article or a theoretical article17)—the
potential audience is smaller for the former than for the latter. Similarly, methodological articles, and judicial opinions dealing with procedural issues, tend to be cited more frequently than substantive
works because they have a broader domain of applicability.
Differences in the vintages of cited works also make comparison
difficult. The older the work, the more time it has had to accumulate citations, but the number of citations is apt to be depressed
by shifts in interest away from the topic of the cited work or by the
appearance of up-to-date substitutes for it. In economic terms, the
stock of knowledge capital created by scholarly or judicial activity,
just like a stock of physical capital, both is durable and depreciates. A
further problem in interpreting the number of citations to a work is
that it may be difficult to distinguish empirically between a work
that is no longer cited because it has been totally depreciated and a
16

“The erudite scholar (rightly or wrongly associated with an older Germanic
tradition) who displays his learning in his footnotes is hardly recording the
strong intellectual influences which have acted upon him. The ostensibly casual
scholar (surely trained at Oxbridge) considers citation beyond a name,
preferably misspelled, to be a pedantical display.” George J. Stigler and Claire
Friedland, “The Citation Practices of Doctorates in Economics,” 83 Journal of
Political Economy 477, 485 (1975).
17 Similarly, theoretical journals tend to be more frequently cited than applied
journals, and in particular the “balance of trade”—citations of a journal versus
citations by the journal—runs in favor of theoretical and against applied
journals. See Stephen M. Stigler, “Citation Patterns in the Journals of
Statistics and Probability,” 9 Statistical Science 94 (1994).
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work that has been so influential that the ideas in it are now referred
to without citation to the works in which they first appeared, and
often without mention of the author’s name (the theory of relativity,
or the theory of evolution, or the concept of consumer surplus).18
For example, counting citations to the writings of Adam Smith or
Jeremy Bentham would be certain to produce an underestimation of
their influence—and in Bentham’s case for the additional reason
that he published little during his lifetime and much of his influence
was through personal contact with people who became his followers
and transmitted his influence through their own writings.19
A point closely related to the last is that differences in citation
rates may be magnified because of the information costs of citers,
which may fall with the number of times a work is cited.20 The
more often the work is cited, the more familiar it becomes, reducing
the cost of recalling and locating the work relative to the cost of
recalling and locating a less cited and hence less familiar work. This
is a kind of network externality, akin to that which makes telephone
service more valuable the more subscribers it has or a new word more
valuable the more people know its meaning.
Another way to see this is to think of the citer as a shopper
among competing “brands.” Because no citation royalty is paid to the
author of the cited work, the more familiar the brand the cheaper it
is to cite it rather than to cite a substitute. John Rawls is thus the
standard citation for the concepts of the original position and the
veil of ignorance, even though those concepts were explained earlier
by John Harsanyi;21 Harsanyi is less well known than Rawls and so
18

“An innovator’s work is accepted and used by others. The influence may be
most powerful when we simply do not cite at all.” Stigler and Friedland, note
16 above, at 486.
19 The problems of using citation analysis to gauge intellectual influence are
well discussed in Harriet Zuckerman, “Citation Analysis and the Complex
Problem of Intellectual Influence,” 12 Scientometrics 329 (1987).
20 Cf. Moshe Adler, “Stardom and Talent,” 75 American Economic Review 208
(1985).
21 As acknowledged, somewhat grudgingly as it seems to me, in John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 137 n. 11 (1971), citing John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility
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it is “costlier” to cite him. The cost of citing the better-known work
is lower not only to the citer, but also to his audience, to which a
citation to a familiar work may convey more information. A raw
comparison of the number of citations to Rawls and to Harsanyi
would thus exaggerate the relative quality, originality, or even
influence of the two theorists. For all the reasons that I have been
discussing in this and the preceding section, and for other reasons as
well,22 the use of counts of citations for purposes of evaluation or
hypothesis-testing must be approached with caution. But it is equally
important to realize that the existence of “noise” in data does not
invalidate quantitative analysis. Critics of citations analysis often fail
to note that if errors in data are randomly distributed with respect to
in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 Journal of
Political Economy 434 (1953).
22 Anthony J. Chapman, “Assessing Research: Citation-Count Shortcomings,” The Psychologist: Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 336, 339–341
(1989), lists 25 problems with using citation data published by the ISI (see note
8 above) to estimate the quality or impact of research. I have discussed the
principal ones in the text, but it may be useful to list all 25 to give the flavor of
the critical literature. In Chapman’s words, “Some journals not considered”;
“Exclusion of citations in books”; “Bias toward applied research”; “Psychology
is in [both] the SCI [Science Citation Index] and SSCI [Social Sciences Citation
Index]”; “Referencing [i.e., citing] conventions”; “Inclusion of letters,
abstracts, book reviews”; “Prestige of publication outlets”; “One ‘citation’ even
if there is repeated reference to the work”; “First-authors only [i.e., only the
name of the first-listed author to a coauthored work is indexed]”; “Crossdisciplinary
comparisons;
and
psychology’s
multi-dimensionality”;
“Comparisons of individuals; and ‘straight’ versus ‘complete’ counts”; “Social
factors influence choice”; “‘Stars’ are overwhelming”; “Name-initial
homographs”; “Bias against some married women [if they have published
under more than one name]”; “Bias against newcomers”; “Few to cite in a
narrow speciality; and self-citations”; “One person—several alphabetical
entries”; “Human errors at ISI”; “Obliteration by incorporation”;
“Methods/recipe papers—spuriously inflated citations?”; “Citation does not
necessarily denote approval”; “Citation without knowledge”; “Quantity is not
quality”; “Citations reflect existing recognition.” See also Cronin and Graham,
note 10 above, at 63–73; Michael H. MacRoberts and Barbara R. MacRoberts,
“Quantitative Measures of Communication in Science: A Study of the Formal
Leve,” 16 Social Studies of Science 151 (1986). Chapman acknowledges that some
of the criticism of citations analysis may be due to sour grapes on the part of
scholars who discover that they are not heavily cited. Chapman, above, at 342.
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the variable of interest (such as research quality or impact), they are
unlikely to invalidate the conclusions of the study, provided that the
data sample is large.23 A related point is that errors that bias both
sets of data being compared equally do not bias the comparison,24
and so if, for example, the question is whether a particular scholar or
journal was more heavily cited in 1999 than in 1989, many of the
errors that might distort the number in each year can be ignored as
not affecting the comparison. But, equally clearly, responsible
citations analysis requires great care in methods of aggregation,
correction, and interpretation. I shall give illustrations of the
necessary adjustments in the course of explaining the two main uses
of citations analysis that have emerged to date—as a tool of
management and as a means of hypothesis testing.25
C ITATIONS A NALYSIS AS A M ANAGEMENT T OOL
When an enterprise produces goods that are sold in an explicit
market, the valuation of its output is straightforward, and generally it
is also feasible to determine the contribution of the enterprise’s
employees and other suppliers to that output. But not all enterprises
are of this kind. Two notable exceptions are research universities and
appellate courts. A principal output of both types of enterprise is
published work that is not sold. This has been thought in some
quarters to preclude analyzing the outputs of these institutions in
market terms.26 An economist would be inclined to question this
conclusion. Academics and judges, economists are prone to believe,
are not much different in basic tastes and drives from other people,
and universities and courts are subject to budget constraints that
require economizing activity. Academic and judicial productivity is
23

Stephen M. Stigler, “Precise Measurement in the Face of Error: A
Comment on MacRoberts and MacRoberts,” 17 Social Studies of Science 332
(1987).
24 Id. at 333.
25 I do not, however, discuss efforts to develop objective measures of citation
content analysis. See, for example, John Swales, “Citation Analysis and
Discourse Analysis,” 7 Applied Linguistics 39 (1993).
26 For a forceful statement of this position, see John O’Neill, The Market:
Ethics, Knowledge and Politics 155–157 (1998).
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much discussed, and comparisons (across academics, academic
departments, courts, judges) are attempted. The problem is one of
measurement rather than of fundamental incentives and constraints.
If that problem can be solved, the market for professors and judges
can be assimilated to normal labor markets. Citations analysis can
make a significant contribution to the solution, and this is important
for operating in these markets as well as for understanding their
operation.
For example, the federal government has for the last fifteen
years been encouraging its research laboratories to focus more on
research having commercial applications. Has the change in policy
been effective? A study of government patents found that government research is indeed being cited more frequently in private
patents. The Patent Office has strict requirements about citing the
“prior art,” as it is called, and this provides a basis for believing that
counting citations in patents provides meaningful, though not
wholly reliable, information about the utility of the cited inventions. The application of this methodology to the evaluation of
research programs, academic or otherwise, is straightforward.
In my own work on judicial administration, I have suggested
that weighting the number of decisions of a federal court of appeals
by the number of citations to those decisions by other courts of
27

See Adam B. Jaffe, Michael S. Fogarty, and Bruce A. Banks, “Evidence
from Patents and Patent Citations on the Impact of NASA and Other Federal
Labs on Commercial Innovation,” 46 Journal of Industrial Economics 183
(1998). The authors cite several previous studies of patent citations. Id. at 185.
28 The authors tried to verify the accuracy of the citations, and found that 75
percent were meaningful, the rest essentially noise. Id. at 202. Baird and
Oppenheim, note 8 above, at 7, estimate that at least 20 percent of citations are
erroneous.
29 See, for example, A. J. Nederhof and E. Van Wijk, “Profiling Institutes:
Identifying High Research Performance and Social Relevance in the Social and
Behavioral Sciences,” 44 Scientometrics 487 (1999); Lawrence D. Brown,
“Influential Accounting Articles, Individuals, Ph.D. Granting Institutions
and Faculties: A Citational Analysis,” 21 Accounting, Organizations and Society
723 (1996); Charles Oppenheim, “The Correlation between Citation Counts
and the 1992 Research Assessment Exercise Ratings for British Research i n
Genetics, Anatomy and Archeology,” 53 Journal of Documentation 477 (1997).
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appeals, which is to say courts not bound as a matter of stare decisis
to follow the cited court’s decisions, yields a meaningful measure of
judicial output. This measure can be used to compare the
productivity of the different courts. It cannot be the complete
measure, if only because it implicitly weights unpublished decisions,
which are not citable as precedents, at zero, even though they are an
important part of the output of modern appellate courts. An
unpublished decision resolves a dispute, which is a useful thing to do
even though it doesn’t create a citable precedent. Some adjustment
should be feasible, however, to yield a total productivity figure. And
when productivity is regressed on the different production functions
of the different courts, it becomes possible to suggest improvements,
as I’ll note later.
An even more audacious use of citations as a judicial management tool is to “grade” appellate judges by the number of othercourt citations to their opinions. Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, in an
ambitious study which I’ll call “the Landes study” for the sake of
brevity, rank federal appellate judges in just this way. There are
comparability problems; the judges are appointed at different times
and to courts that have different caseloads, and the number of judges
as well as the number of cases is changing over time. The authors
seek to overcome these problems by regressing other-court citations
on variables that include—besides the judge himself—the judge’s
length of service, his court’s caseload, the date on which he was appointed, and other factors that are expected to influence the number
of citations that the judge would receive were he of average quality.
The coefficient on the judge variable thus indicates how many
other-court citations are due to his personal characteristics rather
30 Posner, The Federal Courts, note 3 above, at 234. See also Mitu Gulati and
C. M. A. McCauliff, “On Not Making Law,” Law and Contemporary
Problems, Summer 1998, pp. 157, 198–200.
31 William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, “Judicial
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges,” 27
Journal of Legal Studies 271 (1998). This is not the only focus of their study; I
discuss other aspects of it later. For a somewhat similar study, but of Supreme
Court Justices, see Montgomery N. Kosma, “Measuring the Influence of
Supreme Court Justices,” 27 Journal of Legal Studies 333 (1998).
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than to the factors that are not judge-specific which influence citations. Since those factors cannot be controlled for perfectly, the
ranking that the Landes study produced is at best a rough guide to
the relative quality (or influence, or reputation—it is not altogether
clear which is being measured) of the judges in the sample. Still, it
may well be an improvement over purely qualitative efforts to
evaluate appellate judges.
Entire courts can be evaluated similarly. In view of current
criticisms that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
weak, perhaps because of its large size (it is almost twice as large as
the next largest federal court of appeals), and should be split up or
otherwise revamped or reform, it is natural to inquire how that court
fares when this method of evaluation is used. The answer is, not very
well. It ranks eleventh out of the 13 federal courts of appeals and the
low ranking of the Federal Circuit (which is number 13) is probably
due to that court’s highly specialized jurisdiction. Among the
generalist circuits, the Ninth ranks eleventh out of 12 (the twelfth
being the Sixth Circuit). Even the D.C. Circuit, which is also
specialized, though less so than the Federal Circuit, outranks the
Ninth Circuit (at 10).
Citation analysis is more commonly used to rank scholars than
judges and as such is now fairly widely used a management tool in
connection with the hiring and promotion of faculty in research
32

Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, note 31 above, at 318 (tab. 5). See also id. at
277 (tab. 1), 332. Using a somewhat different sample, however, the Landes
study shows the Ninth Circuit receiving an average number of other-court
citations. See id. at 331 (tab. A4). Other quantitative measures of judicial
performance support a negative evaluation of the Ninth Circuit. See Richard A .
Posner, “Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large?” (unpublished, July 1999).
33 See, for example, Fred R. Shapiro, “The Most-Cited Legal Scholars”
(forthcoming in the supplement to the Journal of Legal Studies, note 7 above); B.
K. Sen, “Ranking of Scientists—A New Approach,” 54 Journal of
Documentation 622 (1998); Michael E. Gordon and Julia E. Purvis, “Journal
Publication Records as a Measure of Research Performance in Industrial Relations,” 45 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 194 (1991); Marshall H.
Medoff, “The Ranking of Economists,” 20 Journal of Economic Education 405
(1989).
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universities. This is a natural use of citation analysis because the
principal output of the faculty of such universities is published
research and the more heavily a research paper is cited, the more
influential and important it is likely to be. Again, comparability
problems must be overcome; it would be ridiculous to count citations
of rival candidates of very different length of service and think that
one had made a meaningful comparison, unless perhaps the younger
(not necessarily in age, but in length of time in academia) had more
citations than the older. But adjustments similar to those made in
the Landes study in order to compare the output of different judges
should be feasible and with these adjustments citation analysis
becomes a reasonably objective, though it should not be the only,
basis for making decisions on hiring, promotion, and salary. The
need for an objective basis for such decisions is particularly important
in an era in which academic administrators can be forced to defend
their personnel decisions in the courts against charges of racial,
sexual, or other invidious discrimination.
Citation analysis can similarly be used to evaluate the scholarly
impact (presumably correlated with the quality) of scholarly journals
and academic presses. This has been in fact one of the most
common applications of such analysis. A journal’s “impact factor”
(conventionally, the number of citations in year t to articles published in the journal in years t–1 and t–2 divided by the number of
those articles) can in turn be used to weight a scholar’s citations by
multiplying the number of citations to his work by the impact factor

34

See, for example, Philip Howard Gray, “Using Science Citation Analysis
to Evaluate Administrative Accountability in Salary Variance,” 38 American
Psychologist 116 (1983).
35 See, for example, Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Harry Rothman, “The Editors
and Authors of Economics Journals: A Case of Institutional Oligopoly?” 109
Economic Journal F165 (1999); Alireza Tahai and G. Wayne Kelly, “An
Alternative View of Citation Patterns of Quantitative Literature Cited by
Business and Economic Researchers,” 27 Journal of Economic Education 263
(1996); S. J. Leibowitz and J. P. Palmer, “Assessing the Relative Impacts of
Economics Journals,” 22 Journal of Economic Literature 77 (1984)..
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of the journals in which those citations appear. The aim is to
correct objectively for differences in journal, and hence citation,
quality. The method only seems to involve double counting.
Citations are used to weight the journal, and if it is heavily cited this
might seem to imply that articles cited in it will be cited by later
journals as well. But that is not necessarily so. Suppose an article by
A is cited in an article by B published in heavily-cited (hence
imputed to be high-quality) journal X. B’s article can be expected to
be cited more frequently than if it had been published in a lowerquality journal, but articles citing B’s article will not necessarily cite
articles cited by B, such as A’s article. Nevertheless the fact that B
cited A is, given that B’s article appeared in a high-quality journal, a
mark in A’s favor.
The impact-factor measure has been criticized as “entirely
miss[ing] the archival impact of the journals and giv[ing] much
greater weight to those publications of a more ephemeral nature or
to those publications more concerned with debates about current
issues than with research.” So impact-adjusted citations must
themselves be adjusted; but with this qualification, they can be used
to rank both individual scholars and entire departments more
objectively than by raw citation scores.
The practical utility of citations ranking of scholars is not
limited to academic administration. As I have already intimated, in
cases in which academics claim to have been discriminated against by
the university that employs them, citations analysis can be used to

36

See, for a critical discussion of this procedure, Editorial, “Citation Data:
The Wrong Impact?” 1 Nature Neuroscience 641 (1998).
37 Stigler, note 17 above, at 98. For a striking example, see John P. Perdew
and Frank J. Tipler, “Ranking the Physics Departments: Use Citation
Analysis,” Physics Today, Oct. 1996, pp. 15, 97.
38 See, for example, Raymond P. H. Fishe, “What Are the Research Standards
for Full Professor of Finance?” 63 Journal of Finance 1073, 1077 (1998);
Richard Dusansky and Clayton J. Vernon, “Rankings of U.S. Economics
Departments,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1998, p. 157.
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help determine whether the alleged discrimination was invidious or
was instead based on the plaintiff’s lack of scholarly distinction.
H YPOTHESIS T ESTING WITH C ITATIONS
The use of citations analysis in academic research is conceptually
distinct from its use in academic or judicial administration but
overlaps as a matter of practice. The patent study I cited earlier can
be used to evaluate the government’s research policy but also to test
hypotheses about the economics of technology transfer. We have
seen that studies of judicial citation practices can be used both to
evaluate courts and judges and to test hypotheses about judicial
behavior and explain differences in productivity across courts and
judges. They can be used to identify and trace academic networks
and chart the rise and decline of rival schools of thought within a
discipline.
There are three closely related economic models that can be
used to guide research that employs citation analysis: a human capital
model, a reputation model, and an information model. I will
emphasize the first, which is the most important for reasons that
will become clear, and discuss the other two very briefly. In a
reputation model, emphasis is laid on the fact that reputation is
something accorded by the “reputers” to advance their own self39

Cases in which citations analysis has been used for this purpose include
Tagatz v. Marquette University, 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 1988); Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1987); Demuren
v. Old Dominion University, 33 F. Supp. 2d 469, 481 (E.D. Va. 1999), and
Fisher v. Vassar College, 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1199–2001 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
overruled on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 114 F.3d
1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
40 See Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks, note 27 above, at 202–203; also Adam B.
Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson, “Geographic Localization
of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,” 108 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 577 (1993).
41 See, for a particularly pertinent example, William M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, “The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study,” 36
Journal of Law and Economics 385 (1993).
42 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, ch. 4
(1990).
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interest, for example their interest in economizing on information
costs. This can produce, as I hinted earlier, a “superstar” effect, in
which small differences in quality generate huge differences in
income, or, in this case, in citations. Robert K. Merton argued in
this vein that scholars would use an author’s reputation as a
screening device, and hence tend to cite better-known authors more
frequently than was warranted by any actual difference between the
quality of their work and that of less well-known authors. His
conjecture is supported by a study which finds that journals that use
“blind” refereeing (that is, that do not disclose the author’s name to
the referee) are cited more frequently, after correction for other
differences, than nonblind-refereed journals.
In a recent paper that compares Web “hits” and newspaper
citations to leading legal scholars with citations to these scholars in
scholarly journals, Landes and I found a greater superstar effect for
celebrities than for scholars. We conjecture that this is a function of
the extent of the market. The general public’s interest in law is quite
limited, and the public demand for the output of legal scholars is
therefore easily satisfied by a handful of high-profile figures. The
scholarly community has a much broader interest in legal scholarship
and therefore values the output of a much larger number of scholars.
In the information model, citations are conceived of as creating
a stock of information. The analyst can use the model to illuminate
such issues as the geographic diffusion of information, as in the
patent study that I cited earlier, and the rate at which the stock
depreciates, for example as a function of the generality, and hence
adaptability to changing circumstances, of the cited work. A related
approach, sociological rather than economic in character, seeks to
43

Cf. Sherwin Rosen, “The Economics of Superstars,” 71 American Economic
Review 845 (1981).
44 Robert K. Merton, “The Matthew Effect in Science,” 159 Science 56 (1968).
He called this phenomenon the “Matthew Effect” after the statement in the
Gospel according to St.Matthew that to he who has more will be given.
45 David N. Laband, “A Citation Analysis of the Impact of Blinded Peer
Review,” 272 JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association) 147 (1994).
46 Landes and Posner, note 8 above.
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demarcate schools of thought by identifying patterns of crosscitation.
In the standard human capital model used in labor economics,
earnings are modeled as a function of the investment in the worker’s
human capital (that is, his earning capacity). His stock of human
capital grows in the initial stages of his working career as a result of
on-the-job training and experience. But like other capital, human
capital depreciates, and eventually the worker’s total stock of human
capital declines when new investment falls below the replacement
level as the worker approaches retirement. The reason new
investment falls eventually is that the shorter the worker’s remaining
working life, the less time he and his employer have to recover the
cost of any new investment.
Earnings (E) and years worked (time, t) are thus related as in
E(t) = a + b1t – b2t2, where E(t) is annual earnings as a function of
time (years worked from first job to retirement), a is an earnings
component that is independent of investment in human capital and
is assumed to be constant over time, b1 represents an annual increase
in earnings brought about by investments in human capital, and –b2
represents an annual reduction in earnings caused by depreciation of
the individual’s stock of human capital. The peak year of earnings
(t*) is found by differentiating E(t) with respect to t and setting the
result equal to zero (satisfaction of the other conditions for a
maximum can be assumed), yielding t* = b1/b2. An individual
reaches his peak year of earnings later the more his earnings are
raised by investments in human capital (b1) and the smaller the effect of length of service (hence imminence of retirement) in
reducing his earnings by causing him to invest less in replacing
human capital as it depreciates (b2). If E(t) is replaced by the natural
log of E(t), then the coefficients (b1 and b2) can be interpreted as
rates of growth.
The twist that human capital citations analysis gives to the
standard model is to replace earnings with citations. This is an
appropriate adjustment in the case of activities in which earnings are
47

See, for example, Stigler and Friedland, note 16 above.
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not well correlated with output. The federal judiciary provides an
excellent example. All judges of the same rank (district judges, circuit
judges, and so forth) are paid the same salary, regardless of years of
service, reversal rate, number of opinions published, or any other
factor that might be used by a private employer to determine a
worker’s marginal product.
In many universities, too, faculty compensation is on a lockstep
basis, and even when it is not, salary differentials are invariably far
smaller than any reasonable estimate of differences in the academic
output of different members of the faculty.48 A possible explanation
is that an academic’s full income includes fame49 and so varies across
academics in accordance with differences in the quality or their
work. This point has been made in distinguishing between science
and technology. “Science aims at increasing the stock of knowledge,
while the goal of technology is to obtain the private rents that can
be earned from this knowledge.”50 Because the achievement of the
scientist’s goal depends on complete disclosure, and complete
disclosure impedes the obtaining of rents, science must devise an
alternative method of compensation. “The rule of priority is a
particular form of payment to scientists.”51 This can help us
understand why the acknowledgment of priority is a norm of
scholarship. And the usual form of acknowledgement of priority is

48

Nevertheless, there is evidence that number of citations to an academic’s
work is a significant predictor of his salary. See, for example, Raymond D.
Sauer, “Estimates of the Returns to Quality and Coauthorship in Economic
Academia,” 96 Journal of Political Economy 855 (1988); Arthur M. Diamond,
Jr., “What Is a Citation Worth?” 21 Journal of Human Resources 200 (1986).
This is presumably because scholarly fame is positively correlated with the
value of the scholar’s output.
49 See Paula E. Stephan, “The Economics of Science,” 34 Journal of Economic
Literature 1199, 1206 (1996). Empirical evidence for this conjecture in the case
of economists is presented in David M. Levy, “The Market for Fame and
Fortune,” 20 History of Political Economy 615 (1988).
50 Partha Dasgupta and Paul A. David, “Information Disclosure and the
Economics of Technology,” in Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory
519, 529 (George R. Feiwel ed. 1987) (footnote omitted).
51 Id. at 531.
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citation. However, citations acknowledge other forms of scholarly
contribution as well.
The economic model of citations as an earnings substitute
recognizes that variance in earnings is not a function just of length
of service and investments in human capital. The variable that I
labeled a represents the other factors that influence output, including
quality variables such as intelligence, judgment, and writing skill that
are only loosely (and sometimes not at all) related to training or
other forms of investment in human capital. Recall that in the
Landes study the human capital model was used to predict
differences in the output of court of appeals judges, and the residual
(unexplained) differences were then used to rank the judges, that is,
to determine their relative endowments of a.
An alternative method of getting at a is to limit the comparison
of citations to judges serving on the same court in the same period of
time, thus obviating the need to make adjustments for differences in
caseload composition and in the dates of the cited works, or to
scholars of the same approximate age or length of service. I have used
this cruder method of adjustment to verify the superior quality or
influence of Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand relative to their
colleagues on the New York Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme
Court (for Cardozo) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (for Hand).52 For broader comparisons, however, the human
capital model is indispensable, as it enables correction for differences
in the location of a judge or scholar in the life cycle.
We need not view a as a black box; the Landes study sought to
explain the rankings of federal court of appeals judges by such factors
as self-citation, the degree to which the judge’s court has a specialized jurisdiction (which would tend to reduce the number of citations by other courts), and whether the judge had attended an elite
law school, received a good rating from the American Bar
Association when he was evaluated for appointment, or had previous
52

Posner, note 42 above, at 83–90; Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age
188–192 (1995). See also Henry T. Greely, “Quantitative Analysis of a Judicial
Career: A Case Study of Judge John Minor Wisdom,” 53 Washington and Lee
Law Review 99, 133–150 (1996).
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judicial experience.53 All the factors but the last were found to have a
statistically significant relation to the judge’s rank, and in the
predicted direction.
The study did not find any effect of race or sex on the number
of judicial citations. In contrast, a recent study of citations in
scholarly journals to legal academics finds that being female or a
member of a minority is associated with being cited less frequently
after correction for other factors, such as field and length of service.
The implication is that affirmative action, which is common in law
schools’ faculty hiring, leads, as opponents contend, to the hiring of
less-qualified minority and female candidates, as measured by their
scholarly output once hired. Indeed, the author finds significant
discrimination against Jewish males, who other things being equal
are cited much more frequently than other legal academics.54 Of
course, the Jewish males might just be better than the other groups.
The acid test for discrimination would be to compare the number of
citations to marginal Jewish males to the number of citations to the
marginal members of other groups; if the first number were higher,
implying that the hiring of more Jews would raise the total number
of citations to the faculty, this would be evidence of discrimination.
Another recent study of the legal academy finds a negative
relation between research output as measured by citations and hiring
one’s own graduates as distinct from hiring graduates of other law
schools.55 Still another recent study contributes to our knowledge of
the legal-academic production function by finding (though on the
53
54

Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, note 31 above, at 320–324.
Deborah Jones Merritt, “Scholarly Influence in a Diverse Legal Academy:
Race, Sex, and Citation Counts” (forthcoming in Journal of Legal Studies
supplement). That is not, however, Merritt’s interpretation of her data. A
different study, also emplying citations as a proxy for quality, finds discrimination against women by economics departments. Van W. Kolpin and Larry D.
Singell, Jr., “The Gender Composition and Scholarly Performane of
Economics Departments: A Test for Employment Discrimination,” 49 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 408 (1996).
55 Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, “Inbreeding in Law School
Hiring: Assessing the Performance of Faculty Hired from Within”
(forthcoming in Journal of Legal Studies supplement).
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basis of a very small sample) that scholarship and teaching are net
complements rather than substitutes in the production of scholarship.56 My study of the citations output of the federal courts of appeals57 similarly casts light on the production function of appellate
courts, showing for example that the greater the number and length
of a court’s majority opinions, and the fewer the number of
footnotes and of dissenting opinions, the greater will be the number
of citations to that court by other courts. Footnotes in judicial
opinions tend to confuse the reader, and a dissenting opinion
undermines the majority opinion not only by indicating a lack of
unanimity but also by expressing criticisms of the outcome that the
majority would have preferred to pass over in silence.
The study also found that citation-weighted output fell as the
number of judges on the court rose, which is consistent with the
evidence presented earlier on the Ninth Circuit. Further light is cast
on this issue by regressing the other-court citations data in the
Landes study on the number of judgeships per circuit. The result is a
negative correlation that barely misses statistical significance at the
conventional 5 percent level.58 This is additional evidence that
increasing the number of judges of an appellate court reduces the
quality of the court’s decisions.
The Landes study was limited to judges of the same court
system (allowing for some differences in specialization), and my
studies have been limited to judges of the same court or to courts of
the same system (the federal courts of appeals, again). When
citations to heterogeneous courts are aggregated, citation totals may
still be meaningful as measures of influence, but they cease to be
meaningful as measures of quality. The same is true of studies of
scholarly citations. Comparing total scholarly citations across all legal
scholars59 may be a valid measure of influence, but it cannot be a
56

James Lindgren and Allison Nagelberg, “The False Conflict between
Scholarship and Teaching” (forthcoming in Journal of Legal Studies supplement).
57 Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, note 3 above, at 234–236.
58 The t statistic is –2.091 and the R2 is .33.
59 As in Shapiro, note 33 above.
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valid measure of quality, since differences in citations across fields
may reflect differences in the size of fields and in the number of
journals in different fields, and even citation conventions, rather
than differences in perceived quality. But aggregating scholarly
citations by field over time is a valid method of charting the rise and
fall of different fields, for example (in law) economic analysis, feminist jurisprudence, and doctrinal analysis.60 For that matter,
comparison of citations across fields is meaningful if what one is
interested in is the relative size of different fields; the amount of citation activity is one measure of the amount of research in or
knowledge produced by a field.
Treating a body of judicial opinions as a capital stock invites
attention to the depreciation of precedent, a topic that Landes and I
addressed in the first economic study of legal citations.61 The
analogy to physical capital is here quite close. A specialized machine
can be expected to obsolesce more quickly than one that can be
adapted to different tasks, since the former is less adaptable to
change. Similarly, the more general a precedent is, the less rapidly it
is likely to depreciate. And just as a sturdy machine can be expected
to depreciate less rapidly (other things being equal) than a fragile
one, so the more authoritative the court (for example, the Supreme
Court relative to a lower federal court), the slower the precedents it
produces are likely to depreciate.62 We can also expect the depreciation rate to be higher, the greater the rate of legal change—and so I

60

In Landes and Posner, note 41 above, at 424, we concluded that “the
influence of economics on law was growing at least through the 1980s (it is too
early [in 1993] to speak about the 1990s), though the rate of growth may have
slowed beginning in the mid-1980s; that the growth in the influence of
economics on law exceeded that of any other interdisciplinary or untraditional
approach to law; and that the traditional approach [of legal scholarship]—what
we call “doctrinal analysis”—was in decline over this period relative to
interdisciplinary approaches in general and the economic approach i n
particular.”
61 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” 19 Journal of Law and Economics 249 (1976).
62 Both hypotheses are supported by the study cited in the previous footnote.
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found in a comparison of English and American cases. And a big
change in law, such as the abolition of the general federal common
law by the Erie decision, can have a dramatic effect in obsoleting
precedent.
The age profile of citations is relevant to the study of scholarship, including legal scholarship, as well as judicial behavior. Other
things being equal, the half-life (or other measure of decay) of
citations to scholarly work and scholarly journals is shorter the more
progressive the discipline (or subdiscipline, such as economic analysis
of law, critical legal studies, or feminist jurisprudence) in the sense
that it is continuously generating new research that yields findings
that supersede earlier findings. But citation half-life is longer the
more rapidly the number and size of the discipline’s publication
outlets are growing. The reason for the latter, less obvious effect is
that a rapid expansion of outlets creates more opportunities for older
articles to be cited, assuming there is some citation lag (in part
because of the Matthew Effect—the new journal is not as heavily
cited as the old until it accrues a reputation) so that the articles in the
new outlets will not be cited immediately.66
The net depreciation of human capital is a function not only of
the depreciation rate but also of the rate of new investment. That
rate falls off not only because the expected return is truncated by
retirement but also because of the aging process. Judging is a
famously geriatric profession, especially in the common law
countries, such as England and the United States. In part this is an
artifact of the lateral-entry method of filling judgeships in these
countries: the older the average age of entry, the older the average
age of the profession is bound to be. But another possibility is that in
a judicial system which relies heavily on precedent—a backward63

Richard A. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America 84–87
(1996).
64 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Legal Change, Judicial
Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction,” 9 Journal of Legal Studies 367 (1980).
66 Helmut A. Abt, “Why Some Papers Have Long Citation Lifetimes,” 395
Nature 756 (1998).
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looking mode of decision making—aging will take a lesser toll on
ability than in a profession such as mathematics that emphasizes the
manipulation of abstract models.67 This hypothesis can be tested by
relating citations to the age of the judge whose decision is being
cited; I have done this and found little evidence of a negative aging
effect before the age of 80.68
C ONCLUSION
To summarize, citations analysis guided by economic theory
offers substantial promise of improving our knowledge of the legal
system, in particular its academic and judicial subsystems. Much has
been done already, as I have tried to show; much remains to be done,
if I am correct that citations analysis is a versatile, rigorous,
practical—and, increasingly, an inexpensive—tool of empirical research.

67

Psychologists distinguish between “fluid intelligence,” the ability to
manipulate abstract symbols, and “crystallized intelligence,” the ability to work
from a long-established knowledge base, such as knowledge of one’s language.
68 Posner, Aging and Old Age, note 52 above, at 182–196.
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